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This Article specifically analyzes the legislative proposals and makes recommendations to
ensure that the bills accomplish their stated objective- limiting the Executive’s discretion arbitrarily
to bar and to expel foreigners on political grounds.
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In recent years, the Administration has used political
grounds to deny visas, to exclude, or to seek to expel promi-
nent artistic, journalistic, and political figures.' Victims of this
policy have included Hortensia de Allende, widow of slain
Chilean leader Salvador Allende;' Dario Fo, an Italian play-
wright;3 Nino Pasti, a former member of the Italian Senate and
general in the Italian armed forces;4 Margaret Randall, an ex-
patriate author and professor at the University of New Mex-
ico;5 Choichiro Yatani, a Japanese scholar at the State Univer-
sity of New York at Stony Brook, who was detained in New
York for forty-four days after attending an academic confer-
ence in Amsterdam;6 and Patricia Lara, a Colombian journalist
who was detained and excluded without notice of reasons after
coming to attend the prestigious Maria Moore Cabot dinner at
the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.7
These and other exercises by the Executive of power
under the political exclusion and deportation grounds have in-
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spired legal challenges' and legislative proposals for reform. 9
This Article focuses on recent bills introduced in Congress to
curtail the Executive's authority in this area. The current stat-
utory framework is described, as is the tension the statute cre-
ates with principles of fairness and the freedoms of speech and
association. This Article specifically analyzes the legislative
proposals and makes recommendations to ensure that the bills
accomplish their stated objective-limiting the Executive's dis-
cretion arbitrarily to bar and to expel foreigners on political
grounds.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
In 1903, two years after the assassination of President Mc-
Kinley, Congress enacted a statutory provision prohibiting the
entry of anarchists to the United States.' 0 In succeeding years,
particularly during times of war or national emergency, Con-
gress enacted numerous provisions that mandate exclusion or
deportation of aliens considered "subversive" because of polit-
ical beliefs or activities.'
The current statutory framework, known as the McCarran-
Walter Act, ("Act" or "McCarran-Walter Act") dates from
1952.2 One class of provisions bars aliens from receiving
visas or being admitted to the United States when there is evi-
dence that they will engage in activities inimical to the public
interest;' 3 have been members of or affiliated with certain
groups, held certain beliefs, or engaged in certain advocacy
8. See Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100
HARV. L. REV. 930, 930 n.6 (1987).
9. Id. at 937.
10. E. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965, at 423-27 (1981); see Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 38, 32 Stat. 1213,
1221 (superseded).
11. See generally W. PRESTON JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION
OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (1963).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1184, 1185-1353a, 1353d-1525, 1552 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1988)).
13. The statute provides a bar for
[alliens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has rea-
son to believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or inciden-
tally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest,
or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States. ...
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)( 2 7 ) (1982).
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proscribed by law; 14 or will engage in activities threatening to
14. Such political grounds appear in the statute as:
[a]liens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following
classes:
(A) Aliens who are anarchists;
(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affili-
ated with any organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all
organized government;
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Commu-
nist Party of the United States, (ii) any other totalitarian party of the
United States, (iii) the Communist Political Association, (iv) the Com-
munist or any other totalitarian party of any State of the United States,
of any foreign state, or of any political or geographical subdivision of
any foreign state, (v) any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdi-
vision of any such association or party, or (vi) the direct predecessors or
successors of any such association or party, regardless of what name
such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may here-
after adopt: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph, or in any other
provision of this chapter, shall be construed as declaring that the Com-
munist Party does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means;
(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this para-
graph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United
States of a totalitarian dictatorship, or who are members of or affiliated
with any organization that advocates the economic, international, and
governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in
the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, either through its own
utterances or through any written or printed publications issued or
published by or with the permission or consent of or under the author-
ity of such organization or paid for by the funds of, or funds furnished
by, such organization;
(E) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this para-
graph, who are members of or affiliated with any organization during
the time it is registered or required to be registered under section 786
of Title 50, unless such aliens establish that they did not have knowl-
edge or reason to believe at the time they became members of or affili-
ated with such an organization (and did not thereafter and prior to the
date upon which such organization was so registered or so required to
be registered have such knowledge or reason to believe) that such or-
ganization was a Communist organization;
(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affili-
ated with any organization that advocates or teaches (i) the overthrow
by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means of the Government
of the United States or of all forms of law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers
(either of specific individuals or of officers generally) of the Govern-
ment of the United States or of any other organized government, be-
cause of his or their official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, in-
jury, or destruction of property; or (iv) sabotage;
(G) Aliens who write or publish, or cause to be written or pub-
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lished, or who knowingly circulate, distribute, print, publish, or display,
or who knowingly cause to be circulated, distributed, printed, pub-
lished, or displayed, or who knowingly have in their possession for the
purpose of circulation, publication, distribution, or display, any written
or printed matter, advocating or teaching opposition to all organized
government, or advocating or teaching (i) the overthrow by force, vio-
lence, or other unconstitutional means of the Government of the
United States or of all forms of law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or propri-
ety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers (either
of specific individuals or of officers generally) of the Government of the
United States or of any other organized government, because of his or
their official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruc-
tion of property; or (iv) sabotage; or (v) the economic, international,
and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment
in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship;
(H) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization
that writes, circulates, distributes, prints, publishes, or displays, or
causes to be written, circulated, distributed, printed, published, or dis-
played, or that has in its possession for the purpose of circulation, dis-
tribution, publication, issue, or display, any written or printed matter of
the character described in subparagraph (G) of this paragraph;
(I) Any alien who is within any of the classes described in subpar-
agraphs (B) to (H) of this paragraph because of membership in or affili-
ation with a party or organization or a section, subsidiary, branch, affili-
ate, or subdivision thereof, may, if not otherwise ineligible, be issued a
visa if such alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer
when applying for a visa and the consular officer finds that (i) such
membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or is or was solely when
under sixteen years of age, by operation of law, or for purposes of ob-
taining employment, food rations, or other essentials of living and
where necessary for such purposes, or (ii)(a) since the termination of
such membership or affiliation, such alien is and has been, for at least
five years prior to the date of the application for a visa, actively opposed
to the doctrine, program, principles, and ideology of such party or or-
ganization or the section, subsidiary, branch, or affiliate or subdivision
thereof, and (b) the admission of such alien into the United States
would be in the public interest. Any such alien to whom a visa has been
issued under the provisions of this subparagraph may, if not otherwise
inadmissible, be admitted into the United States if lie shall establish to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admission to
the United States and the Attorney General finds that (i) such member-
ship or affiliation is or was involuntary, or is or was solely when under
sixteen years of age, by operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining
employment, food rations, or other essentials of living and when neces-
sary for such purposes, or (ii)(a) since the termination of such member-
ship or affiliation, such alien is and has been, for at least five years prior
to the date of the. application for admission actively opposed to the doc-
trine, program, principles, and ideology of such party or organization
or the section, subsidiary, branch, or affiliate or subdivision thereof,
and (b) the admission of such alien into the United States would be in
the public interest. The Attorney General shall promptly make a de-
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national security.' 5 These exclusionary proscriptions apply
equally to aliens who wish either to visit temporarily or to im-
migrate permanently to the United States.' 6 Another class of
provisions renders aliens who have "entered"'' 7 the United
States amenable to expulsion on similar political grounds.'"
tailed report to the Congress in the case of each alien who is or shall be
admitted into the United States under (ii) of this subparagraph;
Id. § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982). Although the reference is retained in
the codification of § 1182(a)(28)(E), 50 U.S.C. § 786 was repealed by Act ofJan. 2,
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, sec. 5, 81 Stat. 765, 766.
15. Exclusion on national security grounds applies to:
[a]liens with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney General
knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would, after entry, (A)
engage in activities which would be prohibited by the laws of the United
States relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity
subversive to the national security, (B) engage in any activity a purpose of
which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government
of the United States, by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means, or
(C) join, affiliate with, or participate in the activities of any organization
which is registered or required to be registered under section 786 of Title
50....
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29) (1982).
Although the reference is retained in the codification of § 1182(a)(29), 50 U.S.C.
§ 786 was repealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, sec. 5, 81 Stat. 765,
766.
16. Immigration and Nationality Act § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982). See id.
§ 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (defining classes of aliens ineli-
gible to receive visas); id. § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(defining the various nonimmigrant classes); id. § 245(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2)
(1982) (providing that nonimmigrants may adjust their status to that of permanent
residents as long as the alien is "eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissi-
ble to the United States for permanent residence").
17. "Entry" is defined as "any coming of an alien into the United States, from a
foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or other-
wise." Id. § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(13) (1982). The concept of "entry" defines
which aliens are entitled to "deportation" proceedings before being "expelled" from
the United States, in contrast to those entitled to "exclusion" proceedings before
being barred from admittance to the United States. In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1982); Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
18. Any alien is subject to deportation who:
(6) is or at any time has been, after entry, a member of any of the
following classes of aliens:
(A) Aliens who are anarchists;
(B) Aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affili-
ated with any organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all
organized government;
(C) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Commu-
nist Party of the United States; (ii) any other totalitarian party of the
United States; (iii) the Communist Political Association; (iv) the Coln-
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The criteria for the denial of visas to nonimmigrants and
munist or any other totalitarian party of any State of the United States,
of any foreign state, or of any political or geographical subdivision of
any foreign state; (v) any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate, or subdi-
vision of any such association or party; or (vi) the direct predecessors or
successors of any such association or party, regardless of what name
such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may here-
after adopt: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph, or in any other
provision of this chapter, shall be construed as declaring that the Com-
munist Party does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means;
(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this para-
graph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United
States of a totalitarian dictatorship, or who are members of or affiliated
with any organization that advocates the economic, international, and
governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in
the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, either through its own
utterances or through any written or printed publications issued or
published by or with the permission or consent of or under the author-
ity of such organization or paid for by the funds of, or funds furnished
by, such organization;
(E) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this para-
graph, who are members of or affiliated with an)' organization during
the time it is registered or required to be registered under section 786
of Title 50, unless such aliens establish that they did not have knowl-
edge or reason to believe at the time they became members of or affili-
ated with such an organization (and did not thereafter and prior to the
date upon which such organization was so registered or so required to
be registered have such knowledge or reason to believe) that such or-
ganization was a Communist organization;
(F) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affili-
ated with any organization that advocates or teaches (i) the overthrow
by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means of the Government
of the United States or of all forms of law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or
propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers
(either of specific individuals or of officers generally) of the Govern-
ment of the United States or of any other organized government, be-
cause of his or their official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, in-
jury, or destruction of property; or (iv) sabotage;
(G) Aliens who write or publish, or cause to be written or pub-
lished, or who knowingly circulate, distribute, print, or display, or
knowingly cause to be circulated, distributed, printed, published, or dis-
played, or who knowingly have in their possession for the purpose of
circulation, publication, distribution, or display, any written or printed
matter, advocating or teaching opposition to all organized government,
or advocating or teaching (i) the overthrow by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States or of all
forms of law; or (ii) the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers (either of specific individu-
als or of officers generally) of the Government of the United States or of
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their exclusion from admission were liberalized in 1977
through the enactment of a procedural device, the McGovern
Amendment, which provides for a presumptive waiver of inad-
missibility in certain cases based on proscribed affiliation or
membership. 9 In 1987, anticipating further reform efforts,
any other organized government, because of his or their official charac-
ter; or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property; or
(iv) sabotage; or (v) the economic, international, and governmental
doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United
States of a totalitarian dictatorship;
(H) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with any organization
that writes, circulates, distributes, prints, publishes, or displays, or
causes to be written, circulated, distributed, printed, published, or dis-
played, or that has in its possession for the purpose of circulation, dis-
tribution, publication, issue, or display, any written or printed matter of
the character described in paragraph (G) of this subdivision;
(7) is engaged, or at any time after entry has engaged, or at any time
after entry has had a purpose to engage, in any of the activities described in
paragraph (27) or (29) of section 1182(a) of this title, unless the Attorney
General is satisfied, in the case of any alien within category (C) of paragraph
(29) of section 1182(a) of this title, that such alien did not have knowledge
or reason to believe at the time such alien became a member of, affiliated
with, or participated in the activities of the organization (and did not there-
after and prior to the date upon which such organization was registered or
required to be registered under section 786 of Title 50, have such knowl-
edge or reason to believe) that such organization was a Communist organi-
zation ....
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). Although the
reference is retained in the codification of§§ 1251(a)(6)(E) and 1251(a)(7), 50 U.S.C.
§ 786 was repealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-237, sec. 5, 81 Stat. 765,
766.
19. The McGovern Amendment as enacted provides:
For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the
provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975) and for purposes of en-
couraging other signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the
Secretary of State should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a
nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludable from the United States by
reason of membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization but
who is otherwise admissible to the United States, recommend that the Attor-
ney General grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa to such
alien, unless the Secretary determines that the admission of such alien
would be contrary to the security interests of the United States and so certi-
fies to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Nothing in this section may
be construed as authorizing or requiring the admission to the United States
of any alien who is excludible I sic] for reasons other than membership in or
affiliation with a proscribed organization.
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-105, sec. 112,
§ 21, 91 Stat. 844, 848 (1977) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982)).
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Congress added a provision that prohibits until March 1, 1989,
visa. denial, exclusion, or deportation because of "beliefs,
statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under
the Constitution of the United States. '
20
The McGovern Amendment was added as § 21 to Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 841, 70
Stat. 890. The 1956 act was amended further by the Department of State Authoriza-
tion Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-60, sec. 109, 93 Stat. 395, 397-
98 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2691(b)-(d) (1982)), which provides in pertinent
part:
(b) This section does not apply to representatives of purported labor
organizations in countries where such organizations are in fact instruments
of a totalitarian state.
(c) This section does not apply with respect to any alien who is a mem-
ber, officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
(d) The Secretary of State may refuse to recommend a waiver for
aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance with
the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and
humanitarian affairs provisions.
22 U.S.C. § 2691(b)-(d) (1982).
20. Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988
and 1989, provides:
(a) In General.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no alien
may be denied a visa or excluded from admission into the United States,
subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States, or sub-
ject to deportation because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, state-
ments, or associations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the
United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the United
States.
(b) Construction Regarding Excludable Aliens.-Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as affecting the existing authority of the executive
branch to deport, to deny issuance of a visa to, or to deny admission to the
United States of, any alien-
(1) for reasons of foreign policy or national security, except that
such deportation or denial may not be based on past, current, or ex-
pected beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a
United States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the
Constitution of the United States;
(2) who a consular official or the Attorney General knows or has
reasonable ground to believe has engaged, in an individual capacity or
as a member of an organization, in a terrorist activity or is likely to en-
gage after entry in a terrorist activity; or
(3) who seeks to enter in an official capacity as a representative of
a purported labor organization in a country where such organizations
are in fact instruments of a totalitarian state.
In addition, nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed as applying to an
alien who is described in section 212(a)(33) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (relating to those who assisted in the Nazi persecutions), to an alien
described in the last sentence of section 101(a)(42) of such Act (relating to
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The procedures for exclusion2' (as well as the issuance of
visas2 2 or deportation 23 ) are the same for aliens charged under
the political grounds as under the other substantive provisions
of the Act, with one important exception. Arriving aliens
charged under the political grounds are subject to exclusion
without a hearing if the charge is based on "information of a
confidential nature, the disclosure of which ... would be preju-
dicial to the public interest, safety, or security.
' '2 4
those assisting in other persecutions) who is seeking the benefits of section
207, 208, 243(h)(1), or 245A of such Act (relating to admission as a refugee,
asylum, withholding of deportation, and legalization), or to an alien who is
described in section 21 (c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956. In paragraph (2), the term "terrorist activity" means the organizing,
abetting, or participating in a wanton or indiscriminate act of violence with
extreme indifference to the risk of causing death or serious bodily harm to
individuals not taking part in armed hostilities.
(c) Construction Regarding Standing To Sue.-Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed as affecting standing in any Federal court or in any
administrative proceeding.
(d) Effective Period.-Subsection (a) shall only apply to-
(1) applications for visas submitted during 1988;
(2) admissions sought after December 31, 1987, and before
March 1, 1989; and
(3) deportations based on activities occurring during 1988 or for
which deportation proceedings (including judicial review with respect
to such a proceeding) are pending at any time during 1988.
Pub. L. No. 100-204, sec. 901, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. &.ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.)
1331, 1399-1400, reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 note, at 122-23 (West Supp. 1988).
The one-year sunset provision was included because of the "expected expeditious
consideration of comprehensive legislation revising ... [the political] grounds by the
Committees on Judiciary." HousE CONF. REP. No. 475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 165,
reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2370, 2426.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 235-237, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225-1227 (1982).
22. Id. §§ 104(a), 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1154 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. Id. § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24. Id. § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982). This section provides in its full text
that:
[a]ny alien (including an alien crewman) who may appear to the examining
immigration officer or to the special inquiry officer during the examination
before either of such officers to be excludable under paragraphs (27), (28),
or (29) of section 1182(a) of this title shall be temporarily excluded, and no
further inquiry by a special inquiry officer shall be conducted until after the
case is reported to the Attorney General together with any such written
statement and accompanying information, if any, as the alien or his repre-
sentative may desire to submit in connection therewith and such an inquiry
or further inquiry is directed by the Attorney General. If the Attorney Gen-
eral is satisfied that the alien is excludable under any of such paragraphs on
the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which the
Attorney General, in the exercise of his discretion, and after consultation
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE STATUTE AND
FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION
No principle in the immigration area is more trite than the
notion that an unadmitted nonresident alien has no right
under the Constitution to enter this country. Over ninety
years ago, the Supreme Court observed:
The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from
the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions
upon which they may come to this country, and to have its
declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through
executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by
our previous adjudications.25
This history was described eloquently by Justice Frankfurter in
Galvan v. Press,26 a deportation case that considered, "were we
writing on a clean slate," whether due process places some lim-
itation on congressional power in the immigration area. 7 He
stated:
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power
of Congress under review, there is not merely "a page of
history," . . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly
concerned with the political conduct of government. In the
enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the
Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process .... But that the formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as
firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our
body politic as any aspect of our government....
We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more
sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially
those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liber-
ties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our
with the appropriate security agencies of the Government, concludes would
be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security, he may in his discre-
tion order such alien to be excluded and deported without any inquiry or
further inquiry by a special inquiry officer. Nothing in this subsection shall
be regarded as requiring an inquiry before a special inquiry officer in the
case of an alien crewman.
Id.
25. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
26. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
27. Id. at 530-31.
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constitutional system recognize congressional power in
dealing with aliens .... 28
However, there is also in American jurisprudence a strong
tradition of solicitude for rights under the first amendment, in-
cluding the rights to receive information and ideas. As the
Supreme Court held almost twenty years ago, "[i]t is now well-
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and press]
... necessarily protects the right to receive....' This right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,
... is fundamental to our free society." 29
These fundamental precepts, the deference of the judici-
ary to congressional immigration criteria, and the solicitude of
the courts to first amendment considerations, collided in the
case of Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist and Marxist.30
Mandel applied to the American Consul in Brussels for a non-
immigrant visa to enter the United States for a six-day period,
during which he would participate in a conference at Stanford
University. Additional invitations to speak were issued by
faculty members at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Vassar,
as well as from other groups in Massachusetts and New York.
The Consul denied the visa application, finding Mandel inad-
missible under the provision that excludes aliens who advo-
cate, write, or publish the doctrines of "world communism." 3'
A waiver of that ground of inadmissibility was also denied.
Mandel then delivered his speech telephonically. 2
The American citizens who had invited Mandel filed suit,
arguing that the immigration statutes in question were uncon-
stitutional on their face and as applied, in that they deprived
the plaintiffs of first amendment rights.3 3 The immigration au-
thorities responded that the exclusion of Mandel involved no
restriction on first amendment rights since what was restricted
28. Id. at 531-32.
29. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citations omitted); see Note,
First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149 (1987).
30. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
31. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(28)(D), (G)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(28)(D), (G)(v) (1982).
32. 408 U.S. at 755-59.
33. Id. at 760.
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was "only action."34 The Court, however, found this conten-
tion unpersuasive. "In light of the Court's previous decisions
concerning the 'right to receive information,' we cannot realis-
tically say that the problem facing us disappears entirely or is
nonexistent because the mode of regulation bears directly on
physical movement.""
The government next argued that the first amendment
was inapplicable because the American plaintiffs had access to
Mandel's ideas through "technological developments" such as
the telephone hook-up that had been utilized, and that had
supplanted his physical presence.3 6 The Court again dis-
agreed:
This argument overlooks what may be particular qualities
inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and
questioning. While alternative means of access to Mandel's
ideas might be a relevant factor were we called upon to bal-
ance First Amendment rights against governmental regula-
tory interests . . .we are loath to hold on this record that
existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any
constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this
particular form of access.3 7
On the other hand, the Court found plaintiffs' constitu-
tional argument also to be unpersuasive. "Appellees' First
Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every
instance of an alien excluded under § 212(a)(28), there are
probably those who would wish to meet and speak with him."'38
This prospect led the Court into a dilemma:
Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary
discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive be-
comes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to
weigh the strength of the audience's interest against that of
the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien
applicant, according to some as yet undetermined stan-
dard.39
34. Id. at 764.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 765.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 768; see also supra note 14 (quoting § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)
(1982)).
39. 408 U.S. at 768-69.
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The Court avoided the dilemma by holding that the Attor-
ney General had validly exercised his power by denying a
waiver of inadmissibility to Mandel for his failure to comply
with certain conditions to his prior entries into the United
States.4" It reserved decision, however, in the situation where
no such independent justification for the exclusion was forth-
coming.4 1
The political grounds for exclusion or deportation also
trench on the United States's international obligations. Under
the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe,42 known as the Helsinki Accords, the United States
has undertaken "gradually to simplify and to administer flexi-
bly the procedures for exit and entry. ' 4' The stated purpose
of this section of the Helsinki Accords is "to facilitate free
movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether
privately or officially, among persons, visitations and organiza-
tion of the participating states, and to contribute to the solu-
tion of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connex-
40. Id. at 769. The Court observed that the American citizen plaintiffs had
"conceded" that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all
aliens falling into a class defined by the exclusionary provision in question, and that
all that was at issue was the propriety of the Executive's denial of a waiver of inadmis-
sibility. Id. at 767-68. The basis for the denial evidently was that, by accepting invita-
tions to speak received while in the United States on a previous visit, Mandel had
spoken at a greater number of events than had been specified in his original visa
application for that tour. Id. at 773 n.4 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. The Court succinctly stated its position:
We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the ba-
sis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification
against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communi-
cation with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may be
available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification what-
soever is advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case.
Id. at 770. The lower court decisions subsequent to the Court's decision in Mandel
have sought either to delineate the interrelationship between subsections (27) and
(28) of § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), see Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987); Allende v.
Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985), or the content of the "facially legitimate
and bona fide" criterion, see Allende v. Schultz, - F.2d -, -, No. 87-1469, slip op.
at 20-23, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 4677, at 26-29 (1st Cir. Apr. 15, 1988); Harvard Law
School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525, 531 (D. Mass. 1986).
42. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Aug.
1, 1975, Dep't of State Pub. No. 8826 (Gen.For. Pol. Ser. 298), reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1292 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Accords].
43. Id., reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 1314.
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ion."44 The tension between the political exclusion and depor-
tation grounds and the spirit of these Accords is clear. The
Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe has repeatedly indicated that in its practice and policy
of visa denials, the United States has failed to meet its obliga-
tions under the terms of the Helsinki Accords.4 5
III. THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Three bills were introduced in the last session of Congress
in the Senate"' and House,4 7 including a bill from the Adminis-
tration, 48 to revise the criteria and procedures for exclusions
and deportations on political grounds. These legislative pro-
posals seek in different ways to resolve the tension between
immigration control and individual rights. The success of the
proposals in resolving this basic conflict is discussed below.
Where appropriate, recommendations for change are made.
A. S. 28
OnJanuary 6, 1987, Senator Moynihan introduced the Re-
vision of Alien Exclusion Act of 1987 ("S. 28"), with the fol-
lowing substantive provisions discussed on a section-by-sec-
tion basis.
1. Proposed Section 2(a)
Section 2(a)(1) of S. 28 would amend section 212(a) of the
McCarran-Walter Act by striking out paragraph (28), the provi-
sion allowing exclusion based on an alien's political beliefs, ad-
vocacy, or affiliations.49 S. 28 would help bring immigration
practice in the United States into line with constitutional re-
quirements and international obligations. The legislation
44. Id., reprinted in 14 I.L.M. at 1313.
45. See COMM'N ON SECURITY & COOPERATION IN EUROPE, IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: 1952 MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. passini
(1986); Comm'n on Security & Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Helsiuki
Accords: Hearings Before the Commission on Security and Cooperatioai in Enrope, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. passim (1979).
46. S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
47. H.R. 1119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
48. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
49. "Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is amended - (1) bv
striking out paragraph (28) .... S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a). For the text of
§ 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982), see snpra note 14.
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would also have a minimal impact on the Government's ability
to control entry of persons into the United States. Since 1977,
the McGovern Amendment has provided a presumptive waiver
of inadmissibility for individuals charged under paragraph (28)
when applying for nonimmigrant visas ° The Executive would
lose little by deletion of paragraph (28), except the power to
restrict entry solely on the basis of speech and association,5' in
violation of the first amendment and international obligations.
However, to achieve S. 28's stated goal to "improve the
process for excluding aliens from the United States, "52 the bill
must make substantive changes in the grounds for exclusion in
section 212(a) of the Act beyond the deletion of paragraph
(28). Unless the bill also restricts other aspects of the govern-
ment's broad authority to exclude aliens in paragraph (27),
which allows exclusion for an alien's anticipated activities
deemed "prejudicial to the public interest, ' 53 and paragraph
(29), which permits exclusion on national security grounds,54
the procedural improvements contained in section 3 of S. 28
will have limited impact. 55
The danger that the authorities will be tempted to tailor
50. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982); see supra note 19.
51. The State Department has determined that members of terrorist organiza-
tions are excludable under paragraph (27):
The following type cases are illustrative, but are by no means exclusive, of
those involving a determination of the applicability of Section 212(a)(27).
1.1 Aliens who while in the United States might engage in political or
conspiratorial activities against the United States or foreign governments.
1.2 Aliens who are known or believed to be members of terrorist orga-
nizations engaging in activities such as political kidnapping, hijacking and
extortion.
1.3 Aliens who are known or believed to be operatives of underworld
criminal organizations.
1.4 Aliens who are notorious for allegedly engaging in excesses, in-
cluding physical brutality while in political power in their native land, or
who were prominently identified with any former regime which did so.
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.91 (a)(27), reprinted in
6 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 32-214.18
(1987). Subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph (28) are apparently unnecessary to
reach such aliens. In any case, paragraph (27) could be revised to make explicit its
applicability to members of terrorist organizations.
52. S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. preamble.
53. See supra note 13 (text of § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(27) (1982)).
54. See supra note 15 (text of§ 212(a)(29), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29) (1982)).
55. See iqfra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (discussing S. 28, 100th Cong.,
I st Sess. § 3).
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their stated justifications for barring or expelling aliens to the
statutory grounds mandates that any legislative effort to im-
prove respect for individual rights in the process must achieve
two objectives: (1) adequate procedural safeguards, including
independent review, according to meaningful standards, of the
Executive's decision; and (2) a narrowing of the statutory
grounds.
Therefore, two changes in paragraph (27) should be con-
sidered for S. 28. First, the consular officer or Attorney Gen-
eral should be permitted to rely on paragraph (27) only if he
has "substantial evidence" that it is applicable. "Substantial
evidence" review gives a court a principled basis for judging
the adequacy of the proffered justifications for barring an
alien. Second, the other broad statutory grounds should be
narrowed. Specifically, the "prejudicial to the public interest"
ground for exclusion should be deleted. Notions of the "pub-
lic interest" ultimately, and unavoidably, are grounded in the
subjective views of administering officials, and an exclusion on
this ground is too vague to be susceptible of review even if it
must be supported with "substantial evidence." '56 The remain-
ing grounds for exclusion in paragraph (27)-endangering
"the welfare, safety, or security of the United States"-may be
legitimate reasons for excluding aliens that can be reviewed by
a court if they are more completely defined in the statute.
Congress should require that State and Justice Depart-
ment officials specify in what types of cases they believe para-
graph (27) is applicable. The types of cases should be enumer-
ated in paragraph (27) and replace the broad language permit-
ting the government to exclude aliens who will endanger "the
welfare, safety, or security of the United States." Alternatively,
the legislative history of S. 28 could indicate the appropriate
interpretation of that language.57
56. See 98 CONG. REC. 8082, 8084 (1952) (President Truman's message to Con-
gress upon vetoing the McCarran-Walter Act stated that the "prejudicial to the pub-
lic interest" language would "restrict or eliminate judicial review of unlawful admin-
istrative action").
57. Another possible approach is the one already taken, at least in part, by Con-
gress-albeit on a temporary basis-to qualify the vague language of paragraph 27
with the proviso that it shall not include activities that when conducted by a U.S.
citizen would be protected by the first amendment. See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text. The current temporary proviso does not go this far as it covers only "be-
liefs, statements or associations," and not "activities." See Foreign Relations Author-
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Paragraph (29) should similarly be improved by several
changes. First, the Attorney General or consular officer should
be permitted to rely on this paragraph only if he has "substan-
tial evidence" that it is applicable to the alien. Second, the
clause in subparagraph (A) "or in other activity subversive to
the national security" should be deleted. It serves only to du-
plicate the provisions of paragraph (27). Third, the following
clause should be added at the end of subparagraph (B): "pro-
vided, however, that this subparagraph (B) shall not cover any
speech or activity which, if conducted in the United States by a
United States citizen, would be protected by the First Amend-
ment.""8
2. Section 2(b)
The proposed deletion by S. 28 of section 235(c), which
allows review only by and at the discretion of the Attorney
General for aliens characterized as inadmissible on political
grounds by immigration officers at ports of entry, 59 would
eliminate the disparity in procedural protections available to
such aliens. Under current law, an alien who appears to be
inadmissible to the examining officer at an entry point to the
United States is detained and subjected to further review by an
immigration judge, unless the examining officer believes that
the alien is excludable under sections 212(a)(27), (28), or (29)
of the Act'30 In such cases, the alien is temporarily excluded
and his case is referred to a delegate of the Attorney General
without any review by an immigration judge. The Attorney
General's delegate, a Regional Commissioner of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, may then order the alien per-
manently excluded without seeking further review if he deter-
ization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, sec. 901(a), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182
note, at 122 (West Supp. 1988).
58. Of course, the deportation criteria should be similarly modified and reduced
in scope. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. If anything, our legal system
and jurisprudence are more solicitous of "deportable" as opposed to "excludable"
aliens. See In re Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
59. "Section 235(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is repealed." S. 28,
100th Cong., ist Sess. § 2(b). For the text of section 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)
(1982), see supra note 24.
60. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982). The
provision refers to a "special inquiry officer," but this adjudicator is now denomi-
nated an "immigration judge." See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.20 (1987).
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mines that the alien is excludable on the basis of confidential
information the disclosure of which "would be prejudicial to
the public interest, safety, or security."' 61 Generally, an ex-
cluded alien is entitled to appeal an immigration judge's order
of exclusion to the Attorney General acting through the Board
of Immigration Appeals, 6 except that an alien excluded on the
basis of confidential information under paragraphs (27), (28),
or (29) has no such right of appeal.6"
Under section 235(c), aliens deemed inadmissible for
political reasons have no meaningful opportunity to contest
their exclusion. In contrast, aliens deemed excludable on
other grounds (such as prostitutes, criminals, or holders of
fraudulent visas) 64 benefit from several safeguards against arbi-
trary exclusions by immigration officers.65 For example, the
alien is entitled to a hearing that can be open to the public and
held before an immigration judge, who is empowered to sub-
poena witnesses and documents and to take testimony relevant
to the admissibility of the alien.66 Also, all of the testimony,
orders, exhibits, and motions presented .before the immigra-
tion judge must be included in the administrative record.67 Fi-
nally, the alien may obtain a transcript of the immigration
judge's decision 68 and is entitled to an appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals based on the record created before the
immigration judge.69
The procedural distinction between aliens excluded under
different provisions of the Act is not a principled one.7 ° While
61. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1982); 8
C.F.R. § 235.8 (1988).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 236.7 (1988).
63. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b) (1982).
64. See id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988).
65. See 8 C.F.R. pt. 236 (1988).
66. Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1982).
67. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(e) (1988).
68. Aliens and Nationality; Rules of Procedure for Proceedings Before Immigra-
tion Judges, 52 Fed. Reg. 2931, 2935 (Dep't ofJustice 1987) (minute orders may be
used to obtain transcripts of oral decisions).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 236.7 (1988). Under § 106(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l105a(c)
(1982), habeas corpus review is available in the federal courts for all exclusions under
section 212(a) of the Act, including paragraphs (27), (28), and (29). See infra note 96
and accompanying text.
70. The enhancement of procedural protections recommended herein with re-
spect to pending legislation in the House of Representatives, see infra notes 96-126
and accompanying text, applies as well to S. 28.
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the Constitution may not require a due process hearing,7' the
summary exclusion procedure for national security reasons is a
Cold War relic that should be eliminated in order to provide
protection against arbitrary agency action.
3. Section 3
Section 3 of S. 28 72 requires the Attorney General to ob-
tain a court order before denying entry or a visa to an alien
under new paragraph (27) or (28) of the Act. The forum speci-
71. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 n.8 (1953)
(upholding the constitutionality of regulations that deprived aliens of hearings when
their entry would be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States" in time of war
or national emergency); Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, 5822 (1941).
72. The text of S. 28, § 3, is as follows:
(a) Before any alien is denied a visa to the United States or is other-
wise excluded from admission to the United States under paragraphs 27 or
28 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, the Attorney Gen-
eral (in consultation with the Secretary of State) shall apply for an order
approving such denial to the court described in section 103(a) of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Such application shall include
the factual basis for the Attorney General's knowledge or reasonable
grounds for belief that issuing a visa or permitting admission to the United
States would violate paragraphs 27 or 28.
(b) An application for an order shall be denied by such court if the
court concludes that the Attorney General does not have knowledge or rea-
sonable grounds for belief that issuing a visa or permitting admission to the
United States would violate paragraphs 27 or 28 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended.
(c)(l) If any judge designated under section 103(a) of such Act denies
an application for an order described in subsection (3)(a), such judge shall
provide immediately for the record a written statement of each reason for
his decision and, on motion of the United States, the record shall be trans-
mitted, under seal, to the court of review established in section 103(b) of
such Act.
(2) If the court of review established in section 103(b) of such Act af-
firms the denial of the application for an order described in subsection
(3)(a), then the Secretary of State shall promptly issue a visa to the alien or
the Attorney General shall promptly admit the alien to the United States, as
the case may be.
(d) In considering and reviewing applications to deny visas or exclude
aliens from admission to the United States, the court and court of review
described in section 103(a) and 103(b) of such Act shall conduct those pro-
ceedings as expeditiously as possible. The record of such proceedings, in-
cluding applications made and others granted, shall be maintained under
security measures established by the Chief Justice of the United States in
consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of State and the Director
of Central Intelligence.
S. 28, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3.
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fled in section 3 is the special court made up of federal district
court judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United
States pursuant to section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act 73 ("FISA") to hear applications for orders ap-
proving the use of electronic surveillance in the United States
to obtain foreign intelligence information. According to sec-
tion 3, the FISA court is to grant the Attorney General's appli-
cation for an order only if it concludes that he has "knowledge
or reasonable grounds for belief" that the alien is excluda-
ble.7 1 If the Attorney General's application is denied, the gov-
ernment can appeal the denial to the court of review desig-
nated by the Chief Justice pursuant to section 103(b) of FISA.
The threshold proceeding to determine whether the gov-
ernment can bar an alien on political grounds serves four pur-
poses: (1) to conform review procedures in border-exclusion
and visa-denial cases through a statutory requirement that visa
denials by consular officers be reviewed; (2) to reduce the like-
lihood that this section will be applied in furtherance of polit-
ical goals unrelated to the individual aliens; (3) to develop a
procedure by which the government can present the evidence
it possesses against an alien's application for admission with-
out compromising the confidentiality of national security infor-
mation; and (4) to provide an expeditious means of hearing
cases so that applicants for admission or visas for temporary
business or travel will not have their travel plans unduly
delayed.
The section 3 FISA procedure requiring independent re-
view of visa denials is an improvement over existing law in the
visa area for two reasons. First, it provides review of the con-
sular officer's decision to deny a visa on political grounds.
Currently, review is available only under State Department
regulations.7" Second, and more importantly, the review
would be conducted by an independent judicial body rather
than by an official of the State Department, the agency respon-
73. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1982). The FISA is codified as follows: 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511, 2518-2519 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982).
74. S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b).
75. 22 C.F.R. § 41.130(b) (1987); see Pena v. Kissinger, 409 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-
88 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (discussing the limited role of the courts in reviewing consular
determinations).
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sible for denying the visa.76
In addition, the section 3 FISA proceeding would serve as
an important safeguard against arbitrary border exclusions of
aliens by requiring the Attorney General to obtain an initial
exclusion order. S. 28 thus seeks to redress the potential for
abuse by providing for a threshold review by an independent
judicial body. Section 3 ensures that prior to the commence-
ment of exclusion proceedings and the subjection of the alien
to further detention while he awaits administrative adjudica-
tion, the Attorney General shall have obtained independent
preliminary review by the FISA court of his evidence that the
alien is excludable on political grounds.
The FISA court procedure should also satisfy the govern-
ment's need for special safeguards in dealing with confidential
national security information. FISA requires applicants for
electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence information
cases to provide "a detailed description of the nature of the
information sought and the type of communications or activi-
ties to be subjected to the surveillance, ' 77 except where sur-
veillance is to be obtained from a foreign power on the prem-
ises of the foreign power.78 Even when the exception applies,
the applicant must still provide "a statement of the facts and
circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his be-
lief" that the electronic surveillance will be obtained from a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the
premises at which electronic surveillance will be used are
under the control of the foreign power or agent. 79 Thus, pro-
ceedings under section 3 of the legislation would require the
government to reveal no more national security information to
the FISA court than is currently revealed in FISA proceedings
themselves.
Although the section 3 procedure is a significant improve-
76. Another approach to providing independent review would be to create an
administrative body to review visa denials. The idea of such an entity was often dis-
cussed in Congress at the time the McCarran-Walter Act was enacted. See, e.g., 98
CONG. REC. 5778 (daily ed. May 22, 1952) (remarks of Sen. Moody). The concept
was revived in legislation introduced in the House on June 2, 1987, by Representa-
tive Henry Gonzalez, H.R. 2567, 100th 'Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
77. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, § 104(a)(6), 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)
(1982).
78. Id. § 104(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1804(b) (1982).
79. Id. § 104(a)(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4) (1982).
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ment over the present review of exclusions and visa denials on
political grounds, there are two additional major changes that
should be made to ensure fair review in these cases: (1) the
FISA court should review the Attorney General's application
for an exclusion or visa denial order based on a "substantial
evidence" rather than a "reasonable grounds for belief" stan-
dard; (2) section 3(d) of S. 28 should be amended to require
the court to provide the alien with a summary of the evidence if
it grants the Attorney General's application for an order.
a. "Substantial Evidence" Standard
The "reasonable grounds for belief" standard for review
of the Attorney General's application for an order from the
FISA court in section 3 of S. 28 is borrowed from FISA itself.
Under FISA, the court will grant an electronic surveillance or-
der if it determines "on the basis of the facts submitted by the
applicant there is probable cause to believe"8"' that the statutory
requirements for permitting surveillance are present. The
purpose of FISA is to ensure that foreign intelligence surveil-
lance by the United States government remains consistent with
the probable cause requirement mandated by the fourth
amendment. 8'
In contrast,' the section 3 review of the Attorney General's
determination that an alien is excludable is at least a prelimi-
nary adjudication, and the FISA court should be required to
employ a "substantial evidence" standard in its review. Immi-
gration judges who handle exclusion cases will exclude an
alien only if there is substantial evidence that the alien is inad-
missible. 82 Therefore, the last sentence of section 3(a) of the
bill should be amended to read:
Such application shall include the factual basis for the At-
torney General's belief that issuing a visa or permitting ad-
mission to the United States would violate paragraphs 27 or
28 as well as a detailed description of the sources consulted
in obtaining such factual basis.
In addition, section 3(b) should be amended to read:
80. Id. § 105(a)(3), 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
81. See S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
82. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 3.20() (1987).
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An application for an order shall be denied by such court if
the court concludes that the Attorney General's application
does not provide substantial evidence to support his belief
that issuing a visa or permitting admission to the United
States would violate paragraphs 27 or 28 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, as amended.
b. Adequate Notice Requirement
Requiring the Attorney General to provide the FISA court
"substantial evidence" that the alien is inadmissible might be
claimed to compromise national security. Any such effect,
however, is significantly diminished in that the alien, and
American citizens interested in the alien's right to visit the
United States, are excluded from the section 3 proceeding.
The bill states that the record of FISA proceedings
shall be maintained under security measures established by
the Chief Justice of the United States in consultation with
the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence."5
FISA itself permits disclosure of certain portions of "the appli-
cation, order, and such other materials relating to the surveil-
lance" in the context of a subsequent suppression hearing in
criminal proceedings."4 Thus, section 3(d) of S. 28 should be
deleted and replaced with the following:
If the Attorney General's application for an order excluding
an alien or denying a visa to the alien is granted, the grant-
ing court shall immediately provide the alien with a sum-
mary of the evidence sufficient to give adequate notice of
the reasons for the court's decision. If upon receiving no-
tice of the court's decision the Attorney General files an affi-
davit under oath that disclosure of certain evidence relied
upon by the court in making its decision would harm the
national security of the United States, the court will deter-
mine whether to excise certain portions of its summary on
such basis. Thereafter, in notifying the alien of its decision,
the court shall nonetheless be obligated to provide notice of
the reasons for its decision to grant the Attorney General's
application.
83. S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(d).
84. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, § 106(f), 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (1982).
1988] 489
490 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:467
The proposed notification procedure would promote fair-
ness by ensuring that aliens and interested United States citi-
zens would be aware of which of the alien's activities the gov-
ernment believes supports the threshold bar. A summary of
the court's reasoning would assist the alien and his representa-
tive to participate fully in the subsequent hearings in border-
exclusion cases85 as well as enabling any American citizen to
determine whether a suit challenging the exclusion or visa de-
nial under section 4 of S. 28 is justified.86
4. Section 4
Section 487 is intended to guarantee any United States citi-
zen interested in the travel of an alien to the United States the
right to challenge a visa denial on political grounds. The
Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the question
of whether such a right is provided by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.88 In deciding Mandel,89 the Court apparently as-
sumed that the right exists. °0 Section 4, however, would clarify
85. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1982).
86. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1952) (minority report)
(special care should be taken in nonimmigrant cases where American citizens are
interested in the alien's visit).
87. The text of § 4 is as follows:
Any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof who intends to communicate in person with, including attending a
function for purposes of listening to, an alien who is denied a visa or ex-
cluded from admission into the United States on the basis of paragraphs 27
and 28 of Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as
amended, may bring a civil action on his or her own behalf against any offi-
cial of the United States Government who is alleged to have wrongfully de-
nied a visa to the alien or wrongfully excluded the alien from the United
States. Any civil action under this section may be brought in the district in
which the intended communication was to have occurred, in the district of
the plaintiff's residence or principal place of business, in the district in
which any defendant in the action resides, or in the District of Columbia.
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to grant legal or equitable re-
lief.
S. 28, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4.
88. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and scattered other sections of 5 U.S.C.).
89. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see supra notes 30-40 and accom-
panying text.
90. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court reached the merits of case in-
volving exclusions under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C.
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the issue by preventing an attack based on the standing of an
American citizen challenging an alien's exclusion from the
United States.
B. H.R. 1119
On February 18, 1987, Representative Barney Frank and
forty-six other members of Congress introduced the Immigra-
tion Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1987, H.R.
1119, which seeks to revise the exclusion and deportation
grounds.9 1 The political grounds are specifically reformulated
to provide for visa denials or exclusion in the following in-
stances:
Security Grounds.-Any alien who a consular- officer or the
Attorney General knows, or has reasonable ground to be-
lieve, is likely to engage after entry in-
(A) any activity which is prohibited by the laws of
the United States relating to espionage or sabotage,
(B) any other criminal activity which endangers
public safety or national security,
(C) any activity a purpose of which is the opposi-
tion to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government
of the United States by force, violence, or other uncon-
stitutional means, or
(D) any terrorist activity (as defined in paragraph
(2)(D)),
is excludable. 92
"Terrorist activity" is defined as: "organizing, abetting, or
participating in a wanton or indiscriminate act of violence with
extreme indifference to the risk of causing death or serious
bodily injury to individuals not taking part in armed hostili-
§ 1182(a)(27), stating that the Supreme Court would presumably have raised the
standing issue in Mandel had it considered its jurisdiction in doubt).
91. On April 12, 1988, the HouseJudiciary Subcommittee on Immigration met
and reported out a substitute to H.R. 1119, now renumbered H.R. 4427.
92. H.R. 1119, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(3) (1987). Identical language is
used to provide grounds for deportation of aliens who have entered the United
States. Id. § 3(a)(4). In H.R. 4427, the renumbered substitute to H.R. 1119, the
phrase "which endangers public safety or national security" was deleted from subdi-
vision (B) and the term "illegal" was substituted for the term "unconstitutional" in
subdivision (C).
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ties. '" 3 The exclusion procedure is revised by striking the
summary exclusion procedure under section 235(c) of the
Act. 9
4
The elimination of section 235(c) is justified for the rea-
sons discussed previously with respect to Senator Moynihan's
proposal 5 But full reform also requires a revision of the pro-
vision in the Act governing review of final deportation and ex-
clusion orders. Aliens excluded on national security grounds
are able to seek habeas corpus review of an administrative rec-
ord that may contain classified information not previously dis-
closed to the alien.96 New language should therefore be added
to the review statute based primarily on section 4 of the Classi-
fied Information Procedure Act ("CIPA"), which deals with
discovery of classified information in federal criminal prosecu-
tions.97 The statute should also be amended to provide expe-
dited review of administrative hearings involving border exclu-
sions under section 2(a)(3) of H.R. 1119.98
Permitting habeas corpus review as early as four days after
the commencement of exclusion proceedings is an important
93. Id. § 2(a)(2)(D). In H.R. 4427, the phrase "raising funds for" was added to
the list of prohibited terrorist activities.
94. Id. § 4(a)(10).
95. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
96. Under current law, final orders of deportation are reviewable by the appro-
priate Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to § 106 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a
(1982). Aliens held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judi-
cial review by habeas corpus proceedings. Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 106(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(9) (1982). Aliens subject to a final order of exclu-
sion are limited to habeas corpus review pursuant to § 106(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(b) (1982). The changes proposed herein should be equally applicable to
habeas corpus proceedings and review of final orders of deportation.
The procedure for habeas corpus review is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256
(1982). One significant requirement worth noting here is that habeas corpus is avail-
able only to challenge the legality of the government's "custody" of the alien. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (1982). While "custody" is liberally construed to include, for exam-
ple, an alien subject to supervision upon a deportation order, see, e.g., Marcello v.
District Director, 472 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D. La. 1979), revd on other grounds, 634
F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1981), an alien who has voluntarily left the United States cannot
seek habeas review.
97. 18 U.S.C. App. (Classified Information Procedures Act) §§ 1-16 (1982).
98. Following are the revisions this Article proposes to § 106 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1982):
(c) An alien subject to exclusion under Section 212(a)(3) shall be
deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies if a final order of
exclusion under Section 236 has not been entered within three days after
the alien has been placed under exclusion proceedings, and such alien sub-
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safeguard. Many distinguished would-be visitors to the United
States are deterred from their visits as much by the slow pro-
cess of visa applications as by the Executive's historical use of
the political exclusion grounds.99 It is not inconceivable that
when faced with the narrowing of the political exclusion provi-
sions in section 2(a)(3) of the Amendment, the Executive
would consider prolonging the administrative exclusion pro-
cess in selected cases to discourage visits by its ideological op-
ponents.
The three-day time limit for the administrative exclusion
process is the same time period given to respond to an order
to show cause for retaining a petitioner in custody in habeas
corpus proceedings.10 0 Arriving aliens are invariably detained
when there is a risk that they pose a danger to security.'
Futhermore, the elimination of the summary procedure
under section 235(c) will inevitably result in situations in which
the district courts would be faced with the task of reviewing an
administrative record in exclusion cases containing classified
information. The Executive presumably would seek to exclude
such evidence from the record made available to the alien.
This situation already occurs in deportation cases based on
political grounds. 10 2
The statute governing discovery in habeas corpus cases
ject to exclusion shall be entitled to seek review by a writ of habeas corpus in
accordance with subsection (b).
(d) [Current subsection (c).]
(e) An alien subject to a final order of exclusion or deportation arising
under Section 212(a)(3) or deportability under Section 241(a)(4) shall be
entitled to inspect and copy the administrative record, provided, however,
that if the court finds upon a sufficient showing by the Attorney General that
public safety or national security requires that specified items of classified
information in the record should not be disclosed to the alien, the court may
review such evidence in camera and shall, if feasible, provide to the alien and
his authorized legal representatives a summary of the evidence and an op-
portunity to rebut such summary. Upon motion of the Attorney General,
the court shall issue an appropriate order to protect against the public dis-
closure of any classified information or summary thereof disclosed to the
alien and his representatives pursuant to this subsection. For the purposes
of this subsection "classified information" shall have the meaning assigned
to that term in Section I of the Classified Information Procedures Act (18
U.S.C. App. §§ 1-16 (1982)).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982).
101. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a), (c) (1988).
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appears to permit the court to provide the alien with access to
the full record under review.'0 Alternatively, if the discovery
provisions are deemed not to apply in habeas corpus related to
immigration proceedings, then the federal civil discovery rules
apply.'0 4 Because it is not clear whether the federal civil rules
authorize the extent of discovery that would be appropriate in
habeas corpus proceedings in exclusion and deportation cases,
Congress should take the opportunity to deal explicitly with
the disclosure of classified information in this context. The
proposal made here 0 5 looks primarily to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure ("Fed. R. Crim. P.") and CIPA as a model
for handling classified evidence in deportation and exclusion
habeas corpus proceedings. In federal criminal cases, defend-
ants are entitled to review classified information relied upon by
the government.0 6 Proposed section 106(e) would similarly
entitle aliens to review classified information relied upon by
the government in cases of exclusion and deportation under
political grounds, or a summary of such evidence, if feasible.
The proposed revision does not seek automatic disclosure
of classified evidence contained in the administrative record
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 2247 (1982).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a). Because § 235(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)
(1982), insulates the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") from con-
ducting exclusion hearings on political grounds where classified information is in-
volved, the INS has not developed regulations to deal with the treatment of such
information in the administrative hearings. In the context of an asylum application in
an exclusion or deportation proceeding, however, the INS has developed the follow-
ing procedure to deal with non-record evidence which is defined as evidence classi-
fied under a particular Executive Order:
(d) Disclosure of non-record evidence. The immigration judge may disclose
to the asylum applicant the non-record evidence, or any part thereof, to the
extent that he believes he can do so and still safeguard the information and
its source. The applicant shall be provided opportunity to rebut any evi-
dence so disclosed. A decision based in whole or in part on non-record
evidence shall state that such evidence is material to the decision.
8 C.F.R. § 208.10(d) (1988). Revised proposed asylum regulations continue this dis-
closure mechanism in asylum cases in the immigration court. See 53 Fed. Reg.
11,303, 11,309-10 (1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3(c)(4), 242.17(c)(4)(D))
(proposed Mar. 28, 1988).
105. See supra note 98, proposed § 106(e).
106. The broad right of a criminal defendant to confront the evidence against
him is limited in some respects by FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(l), which provides for the
issuance of protective orders by district courts, and by the Classified Information
Procedures Act §§ 3-4, 18 U.S.C. App. §§ 3-4 (1982). See infra notes 108-25 and
accompanying text. See generally 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.05[l] (1988).
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for two reasons. First, defendants in criminal cases are af-
forded greater solicitude under the Constitution than are
aliens seeking entry to the United States.1 0 7 Second, it is un-
likely that anyone would choose to become a criminal defend-
ant in order to gain access to classified information that Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16 might require the Government to disclose to him.
In contrast, there is at least a possibility that aliens would seek
entry to the United States in order to gain access to the classi-
fied information that they suspect the Government would rely
upon to support their exclusion.
At the same time, proposed section 106(e) is drafted in
recognition of two factors entitled to considerable weight in
determining the scope of the Government's classified informa-
tion privilege: first, the alien's compelling need for the evi-
dence to enable him to respond to the case against him, and
second, the drastic result of deportation or exclusion faced by
the alien if his habeas corpus petition is unsuccessful.'
Therefore, the proposed language treats the administrative
record below like evidence under section 4 of CIPA by preserv-
ing the government's right to deny the alien access to classified
information if necessary for national security reasons, while re-
quiring the court to provide a summary of such evidence to the
alien and to review undisclosed portions of the record fully in
camera.
In fact, the discovery afforded the alien by proposed sec-
tion 106(e) would not be as expansive as that afforded the
107. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953) (full hearing not prerequisite to exclusion); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893) (Congress has exclusive power to determine
what, if any, procedural protections are accorded aliens to be excluded or deported).
Distinctions are also drawn in the immigration context. In deportation proceedings,
the authorities would have to establish deportability by "clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true." Woodby
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 292 (1966). In exclusion pro-
ceedings, the burden to establish admissibility is on the alien. Immigration and Na-
tionality Act § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
108. See Attorney Gen. v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928.951 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
In the Irish People case, a civil enforcement action under the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the defendant claimed a
right of discovery of classified materials for its defense of selective prosecution. In
finding no colorable grounds to warrant discovery, the court noted that factors affect-
ing disclosure include likelihood that material may serve to exculpate, necessity for
defense, and what a defendant stands to lose. 684 F.2d at 951.
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criminal defendant under section 4 of CIPA. Section 106(e)
entitles the alien only to classified information placed in the
administrative record by the Executive, or a summary of such
information if the court finds that disclosure of the information
is not permitted by public safety or national security. In con-
trast to a criminal defendant's rights under Rule 16, the alien
will in no circumstances receive any classified information, or a
summary thereof, that might be material to his case if the Gov-
ernment itself is not relying on such information. It should
also be noted that proposed section 106(e) incorporates the
provisions for protective orders contained in Rule 16 of the
Fed. R. Crim. P. and section 3 of CIPA, preventing the alien or
his representatives from disclosing to the public classified in-
formation obtained pursuant to that statute.
Proposed section 106(e) vests the court with discretion to
determine whether classified information shall be excised from
the record and whether the Government's summary of such in-
formation is adequate. For an alien's participation to be mean-
ingful in habeas corpus proceedings, Congress should make it
clear in legislative history that a court exercising its discretion
to deny availability of certain evidence in the record must make
an explicit finding that reasons of national security require that
result.' °9 It should also be clear in the legislative history that
the court will permit the "if feasible" language to deny the
alien a summary of classified evidence only in compelling cir-
cumstances, such as classified physical evidence,'' ° or lists of
109. Section 1 of CIPA, 18 U.S.C. App. (Classified Information Procedures Act)
§ 1, as incorporated into proposed section 106(e), defines classified information as
items determined pursuant to an Executive Order, statute, or regulation to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security. National
security is defined in CIPA § 1(b), 18 U.S.C. App. (Classified Information Procedures
Act) § 1 (b), as the national defense and foreign relations of the United States. To
assert the privilege for any specified classified information, the head of the depart-
ment will have to consider each piece of evidence and formally assert the privilege.
See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815,
821 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Section 106(e) includes the limitation that the privilege is avail-
able only if the court finds that the properly classified information requires protec-
tion from disclosure for reasons of public safety or national security. See Ellsberg v.
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("privilege may not be used to shield any
material not strictly necessary to prevent injury to national security"). The responsi-
ble agency's determination of this necessity is afforded appropriate deference. Id. at
58.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1983) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for physical inspec-
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agents and informants.
Nor should the Government's privilege to excise specified
classified information from certain documents permit it to
deny the alien access to portions of the document that the
court does not rule exempt from disclosure. Section 4 of CIPA
authorizes the court to "delete specified items of classified in-
formation from documents to be made available to the defend-
ant."' I I
Cases involving judicial review of visa denials conducted
by federal courts under the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vide further support for this proposal. The proposed language
is intended to codify the courts' reluctance in those cases to
make findings based on in camera review of classified evidence,
and to create a discovery mechanism to provide the alien with
the classified information governed by an appropriate protec-
tive order or a summary of such information.
In the leading case, Abourezk v. Reagan,'"2 the District of
Columbia Circuit, in remanding an order granting summary
judgment for the Government in a challenge to a political visa
denial, expressed serious concern about the district court's re-
liance on the Government's ex parte in camera submissions:
We caution the district court, in the further proceedings
this opinion requires, to make certain that plaintiffs are ac-
corded access to the decisive evidence to the fullest extent
possible, without jeopardizing legitimately raised national
security interests.
It is a hallmark of our adversary system that we safe-
guard party access to the evidence tendered in support of a
requested court judgment. The openness of judicial pro-
ceedings serves to preserve both the appearance and the re-
ality of fairness in the adjudications of United States courts.
It is therefore the firmly held main rule that a court may not
dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex parte, in
camera submissions [citation omitted].
tion of classified surveillance equipment where defendant was allowed extensive
cross-examination of equipment operators).
111. 18 U.S.C. App. (Classified Information Procedures Act) § 4 (emphasis ad-
ded); see Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("sensitive information
must be disentangled from nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the
latter").
112. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afd mere. by an equally divided Court, 108 S.
Ct. 252 (1987).
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Exceptions to the main rule are both few and tightly
contained. Most notably, inspection of materials by a judge
isolated in chambers may occur when a party seeks to prevent
use of the materials in the litigation. When one side, seeking
to block consideration of relevant matter, asserts an eviden-
tiary privilege, the court may inspect the evidence in camera
and alone for the limited purpose of determining whether
the asserted privilege is genuinely applicable [citation omit-
ted]. If the court finds that the claimed privilege does not
apply, then the other side must be given access to the infor-
mation; if the court's finding is that the privilege does apply,
then the court may not rely upon the information in reach-
ing its judgment. [Citation omitted.] In either case, no
party will be faced-as were the plaintiffs in this case-with
a decision against him based on evidence he was never per-
mitted to see and to rebut.'
13
The Abourezk court concluded that the visa denials could
not be upheld on the basis of classified information that the
plaintiffs had not been given an opportunity to review or rebut,
even though the district court below published an abbreviated
summary of the classified information, which informed plain-
tiffs that the aliens were excluded on the basis of their "per-
sonal status as officials of governments or organizations which
are hostile to the United States." ' 1 4
In EI-Werfalli v. Smith," 5 the district court provided a sum-
mary of the contents of classified information sufficiently de-
tailed to permit the alien an opportunity to contest his exclu-
sion.'" Relying on concerns similar to those expressed by the
Abourezk court regarding the harm caused to the adversarial
process by in camera review of evidence, and noting the absence
113. Id. at 1060-61. The court recognized, however, two other exceptions. The
first is where the Government invokes the state secrets privilege and the court finds a
"large risk that an unjust result would eventuate if the case proceeded without the
privileged material." Id. at 1061 (citing Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir.
1984)). The second is where a statute authorizes in camera review, giving as an exam-
ple the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). 785 F.2d at 1061.
114. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated and re-
manded, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd merei. by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct.
252 (1987).
115. 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
116. See id. at 154; see also Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (D. Mass.
1985) (citing with approval the provision of such a summary by the El-11"erfalli court).
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of an El-Werfalli-type summary of classified documents, the dis-
trict court in Allende v. Schultz i17 refused summary judgment for
the Government in a challenge to the denial of a visa to Hor-
tensia Allende. After reviewing the Government's declassified
affidavit, the District Court later ruled that the Government
could not exclude Allende on the basis of her memberships in
the World Peace Council and the Women's International Dem-
ocratic Federation, her criticism of American foreign policy,
and her expressions of support for nuclear disarmament at fo-
rums sponsored by those organizations.' 18
Thus, the proposed language of section 106(e) results
from the concern expressed by the courts in Abourezk and Al-
lende in excluding aliens on national security grounds when the
aliens, or those supporting the aliens' applications for admis-
sion, have not been afforded the opportunity to review the
Government's evidence or, at the very least, a summary of such
evidence. Indeed, Abourezk and Allende would suggest that
courts would be inclined to review the Government's claims of
exemption from disclosure under section 106(e) carefully, and
would review the summaries of undisclosed classified evidence
to ensure that the alien has received the greatest measure of
information permitted by the requirements of national security
and public safety.
Proposed section 106(e) is also not inconsistent with civil
cases in which the Government is a party, although the right to
discovery of classified information in those cases is not clear.
In Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc. ," 19 a civil enforcement ac-
tion pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act,' 2 1 the
District of Columbia Circuit developed a test for disclosure of
classified information that balances the necessity of the infor-
mation for an effective defense and the stakes at issue for the
defendant against the Government's interest in preserving the
secrecy of the classified information and in maintaining the ac-
tion.' 2 1 In developing this test, the court made several obser-
117. 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (D. Mass. 1985).
118. Allende v. Shultz, Civ. Action No. 83-3984-C, slip op., 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2798 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1987), aff'd, - F.2d -, No. 87-1469, 1988 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4677 (1st Cir. Apr. 15, 1988).
119. 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
120. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
121. Irish People, 684 F.2d at 951.
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vations relevant to the proposal here. First, it considered
whether the Government's refusal to permit discovery of clas-
sified information may require the court to dismiss the Gov-
ernment's action.' 22 By analogy, while the Executive does not
bring a habeas corpus proceeding to revive an exclusion or de-
portation order, it is responsible for the order's existence by
declaring the alien inadmissible or deportable, rather than
choosing to admit the alien, even under conditions that may be
imposed by the Attorney General pursuant to section
214(a).' 23 Second, the court held that the "likelihood of injus-
tice" to the defendant in Irish People was small because "no
constitutional rights are threatened, only registration is immi-
nent, [and] no jail sentence looms.' 24  In the immigration
context, where the alien, ordinarily detained, faces deportation
or exclusion, the need for disclosure of classified information
is much more compelling. Finally, the court suggested that an
alternative to disclosure of the evidence would be to require
findings of fact to be made from the undisclosed classified in-
formation.' 25 This suggestion supports the approach taken in
proposed section 106(e) requiring provision of a summary of
the classified information that cannot itself be disclosed with-
out harm to national security.' 26
122. Id. at 950-52. The context of the case contemplated a dismissal by the Dis-
trict Court under FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
124. Irish People, 684 F.2d at 953.
125. Id. at 954-55. For a discussion of closely related issues, though arising
from civil litigation, see In re Attorney Gen., 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.) (vacating contempt
order imposed on Attorney General for failure to disclose information derived from
informants, and directing the district court to consider issue-related sanctions au-
thorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 903 (1979).
126. Where the Government is a defendant, courts may be less inclined to com-
pel discovery of classified evidence because the likelihood of harm to the moving
party is less apparent. For example, in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953),
the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' entry of judgment against the
Government in a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1982), after the Government refused to provide the trial court with
purportedly classified documents so it could make a ruling on whether the docu-
ments would be discoverable by the plaintiffs. The Court held that, in certain cir-
cumstances, the trial court must determine whether the Government's privilege is
applicable without reviewing the documents themselves. Id. at 10. In ReYnolds, how-
ever, plaintiffs had other means of establishing the Government's liability without
gaining access to the classified information. Id. at 11. The Reynolds Court went on to
say, "[wihere there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not
be lightly accepted." Id. Proposed § 106(e) governs situations where the alien has a
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C. H.R. 3293
On September 16, 1987, Representative Peter Rodino, at
the Administration's behest, introduced legislation to revise
the political grounds for exclusion and deportation. 2 7 The.
Administration's proposed bill adjusts the grounds for exclu-
sion and deportation, respectively sections 212(a) and 241(a)
of the Act' 28 and repeals the McGovern Amendment. 29 But
the bill fails to address in a comprehensive way the substantive
abuse of the political exclusion and deportation provisions of
the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, and ignores alto-
gether the need for procedural reform. The impetus for re-
form would be unappeased by passage of the Administration
bill, which would have little practical effect on the Executive's
current authority to exclude or deport aliens seeking to visit
the United States to engage in political, scientific, and artistic
discussions.
While the Administration bill would eliminate the vague
"prejudicial to the public interest" and endangering the "wel-
fare" grounds for exclusion under section 212(a)(27),1 ° its
proposal to add the equally vague "potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences" basis for exclusions to paragraph
(a)(27)13' is susceptible to the same type of abuse.
The Administration's proposal that appropriate legislative
history be developed, indicating that (a)(27) cannot be used to
exclude aliens for reasons of ideology alone, 3 2 is inadequate.
The Supreme Court has already suggested in Mandel that the
first amendment rights of American citizens seeking to engage
in a dialogue with an alien prohibits visa denial or exclusion on
the basis of the alien's speech and ideology. 33 The Adminis-
tration, however, apparently seeks to retain the right to ex-
strong necessity for the classified information and has no alternative means of discov-
ering the Government's case against him.
127. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
128. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-6. Sections 212(a) and 241(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act are codified, respectively, as 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a), 1251(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
129. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7; seesupra note 19 (text of the McGov-
ern Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982)).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982) (quoted supra note 13).
131. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1.
132. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (section-by-section analysis).
133. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767-69 (1972).
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clude an alien whose coming to the United States may under-
mine support for the Administration's foreign policy objec-
tives."' But the State Department already uses guidelines
1 5
that could be a basis for a much more narrow formulation than
the Administration's proposed revision.
The Administration also seeks to add certain portions of
paragraph (a)(28) on the basis that it is necessary to retain the
Executive's authority to exclude "terrorists". 13' The Adminis-
tration's authority in this area should be protected. Its pro-
posed revisions, however, are potentially overbroad. Instead,
paragraph (a)(28), with its intolerance of diverse opinions,
should be eliminated altogether, and paragraph (a)(27) could
be amended to give the Government authority to exclude
those aliens currently affiliated with organizations engaging in
violent activities that may endanger public safety or national
security. More fundamentally, greater procedural protection,
such as that discussed above, is needed so that Executive au-
thority to exclude "terrorists" will not preclude inquiry into
the cases of wrongfully-charged aliens.
CONCLUSION
The impetus to reform the political exclusion and depor-
tation provisions is strong. Almost everyone who has spoken
publicly to the issue, including a Government spokesperson, 137
has recognized that the substantive exclusion provisions
should be narrowed and that aliens should not be barred or
deported for engaging in activities or having affiliations or be-
liefs that, if such aliens were American citizens, would clearly
be protected under the first amendment. But a comprehensive
134. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afd men. by an
equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
135. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 41.91(a)(27),
reprinted in 6 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 32-
214.18 (1987); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
136. H.R. 3293, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (section-by-section analysis).
137. Ogden, Ideological Grounds'Are a Myth, N.Y. Times,Jan. 10, 1987, at 27, col.
3. Jerome Ogden, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services, described
the sole grounds for denying waivers of exclusion under § 212(a)(27)-(29) as "inter-
nal security concerns; prevention of a potentially adverse effect upon the conduct of
our foreign relations; and an alien's advocacy of violence to achieve political ends."
Id. He agreed that it would be improper to deny a waiver of exclusion based on
"abstract beliefs," but disclaimed any such occurrence. Id. at col. 6.
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approach is needed in revising the criteria and establishing ba-
sic procedural protections for those subject to the provisions.
One danger is that Congress will neglect to reform the proce-
dural deficiencies that deprive those subject to visa denials and
exclusion of an opportunity to rebut the evidence on which the
authorities rely. Without giving such aliens such basic rights,
these individuals, Congress, and the American people will be
left with invitations to abuse and conclusory assurances by offi-
cials when these laws are invoked. Our tradition of fairness
and due process demands more.
